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Alternatives to the Use of Force and the
Role of the United Nations
CHARLES S. MILLIGAN*
I. THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The subject of this paper, "alternatives to the use of force," goes to
the essence of the United Nations. The U.N. addresses numerous other
subjects as well and arguably succeeds more in other areas than in this
central purpose. Because various limitations and deficiencies of the U.N.
will be addressed, it is important for me to dissociate myself entirely from
those whose criticism undermines both internationalism and peace
processes,' and also from those who laud the several types of utopianism2
which discount the role of political structures and international law in the
quest for world peace.
The U.N. Charter's most familiar words are "to save succeeding gen-
erations from the scourge of war."3 The Charter states further that the
U.N.'s goal is "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one
another."4 Clearly, attitudes and habits of mind have a role in sustaining
governmental peace policies. The Preamble also recognizes the necessity
for structures and instrumentalities to promote both peace and other
goals. Thus the U.N. intends "to unite our strength to maintain interna-
tional peace and security; and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles
and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save
in the common interest."5 Subsequent articles of the Charter implement
these purposes, accompanied by authorization to devise new instruments
as changing times bring forth new problems or opportunities.
The Gulf War has directed attention to the Charter provisions which
allow the authorization of armed force.' However, two important qualifi-
* Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Iliff School of Theology.
The core of this paper was presented at a conference on "The Use of Force in the Post
Cold War Era," March 15, 1991, sponsored by the International Legal Studies Program of
the University of Denver College of Law. Material has been added in the light of subsequent
events, but the basic position remains as presented.
1. See, e.g., The Heritage Foundation and the United Nations: Dying Dia-Tripes,
United Nations Ass'n, USA, Nov. 1989.
2. See, e.g., Ronald Glossop, Toward Democracy for the World Community, unpub-
lished paper presented at the Conference on The Ethics of Democracy, sponsored by the
Institute for Advanced Philosophic Research at Estes Park, Colorado, August 15, 1991.
3. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
4. Id.
5. Supra note 3 (emphasis added).
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 39-51; see also UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTIONS
RELATING TO THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, U.N. Doc. DPI/11-4/Rev.
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cations, less frequently cited, exist. First, armed force, especially if used
offensively rather than defensively, may be used only as a last resort.
7
The Charter provides for active use of armed force in several places. For
example, Article 45 states:
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military mea-
sures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force
contingents for combined international enforcement action. The
strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for
their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid
down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43,
by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee.8
Clearly, defensive use of force is distinguishable from an offensive or in-
vasive use, although admittedly the line between them can blur in many
actual situations.
Second, when the Security Council authorizes the use of armed force,
it is not a blanket endorsement. Instead, force may be used to the degree
and within the limits set by the authorizing resolution and by provisions
noted in other articles." Once combat has begun, it is extremely difficult
to observe restraint. For example, the Bishop of London, the Very Rever-
end Winnington-Ingram, during World War I urged young English
soldiers to "kill Germans . .. to kill the good and the bad, to kill the
young and the old, to kill those who have shown kindness to our wounded
... As I have said a thousand times, I look upon it as a war of purity."10
Ultima ratio regum (the final argument of kings, force). Self-re-
straint is difficult in times of tension and conflict as they are not politi-
cally profitable. Nonviolent procedures require self-imposed restraints
from the beginning and throughout their operation. This would require a
shift from world leaders who exploit fears and hatred, and escalate the
1-40059-(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 846-64 (May 1991).
7. The U.N. must observe stages of intensity. Chapter VII of the Charter deals with
"action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression."
Article 40 provides for "provisional measures" involving communication and recommenda-
tions "in order to prevent aggravation of the situation." These measures must be imple-
mented "without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned." Arti-
cle 41 outlines measures the Security Council may authorize "not involving the use of
armed force" (emphasis added). Article 42 provides for the use of force in a defensive en-
forcement role, in case "measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate." This is similar to the weapons police carry to back up their en-
forcement, but do not normally use unless compliance with their orders requires the coer-
cive power of physical force. As Article 42 states: "Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations."
8. Supra note 6, at art. 45 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at arts. 41-43.
10. See Swords into Plowshares, Plowshares into Swords, LIBERTY, Sept.- Oct. 1985, at
4; see also Dick Cheney, Associated Press, Aug. 2, 1991 ("I think it was a catharsis.., that
sort of lifted the burden").
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rhetoric of violence and passion, to leaders able to convincingly articulate
the wisdom and courage of steadiness, persistence and effectiveness to-
ward solutions. Above all, leaders and the public must exercise patience
when patience is required for constructive results. William Ernest Hock-
ing spoke of this during World War I. After asserting the importance of
the ability to act and sustain motivation, he added, "[b]ut readiness to
wait, the negative element in morale, is as important as readiness to act,
and oftentimes it is a harder virtue.""1 Consider also the words from
Louis B. Sohn, Bemis Professor of International Law, Emeritus, of
Harvard, which serve as a summary of the discussion to this point. Speak-
ing of the proposed addition of new rules for international behavior, he
says:
Such rules will not help, however if national decision-makers should
continue to arrogate to themselves the right to determine in each case
whether the rules permit them to engage in a particular activity re-
gardless of consequences to other countries. This kind of traditional
self-judging privilege has to be replaced by conferring on impartial
international tribunals or boards the power to decide whether a par-
ticular activity is legal; what are the bounds for that activity, and
what correlative restrictions should be imposed on other parties to
avoid unnecessary provocation. All disputes should be settled "legally,
not lethally" as escalation of any dispute can endanger the future of
mankind and the life on our planet. The Charter of the United Na-
tions is correct in emphasizing that any dispute or situation, "the con-
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security," is of concern to the United Nations as a
whole. "'2
II. HINDRANCES TO THE UNITED NATION'S EFFECTIVENESS
The Charter of the United Nations reflects circumstances at the time
of its adoption on June 26, 1945.11 Inevitably developments since then
have occurred which render some of the concerns less important. Con-
versely, other circumstances have arisen which were unforeseen and not
provided for in the Charter. That time causes change would not have sur-
prised the founders, but I imagine they would have been very surprised
- and dismayed - about some of the particulars of those changes. The
U.N. founders would have been astonished that good people in allegedly
democratic nations would exploit fears for political gain; that Stalin
would become paranoid with such tragic consequences; that Joseph Mc-
Carthy would dominate the U.S. political scene, unopposed by an other-
wise decent U.S. president, to leave a legacy of deceit and suspicion; or
that the Cold War between the superpowers would become the basis of
international politics for nearly forty years. The founders anticipated ba-
ll. W. E. HOCKING, MORALE AND ITS ENEMIES 17 (1918).
12. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO WORLD PEACE viii (1985).
13. The United Nations Charter came into force October 24, 1945.
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sic cooperation between the powers which in short time became obsessive
enemies. This lack of international cooperation has hindered the fulfill-
ment of the Charter.
Additionally, the Charter called for the establishment of a Military
Staff Committee, to be composed of "the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent
members of the Security Council or their representatives."'" It was to
function as an advisory group, providing counsel and guidance to the Se-
curity Council in particularly sensitive and difficult situations. It has
never functioned. 5
Also, the individual veto power which the five permanent members of
the Security Council possess has often been blamed for the U.N.'s inabil-
ity to act. It was thought at the time that the United States Senate would
not ratify membership without the protection of national interest; the
other four nations may have had similar sentiments. Although it is true
that the veto power has often stymied the Security Council, in retrospect
it is at least arguable that, given the Cold War and the rise of nationalism
and fundamentalism, the U.N. might have perished had it not been for
the veto power. The Soviets might have left the U.N. when votes were
consistently going against them during Stalin's reign. Similarly, the
United States might have left during Vietnam and Nicaragua, if votes
had been taken. It seems the veto power was necessary; the world and the
national leaders were not ready for a supranational decisionmaking body
on issues of war and peace.
The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, was a functional continuation of the Permanent Court of
International Justice of the League of Nations. Authorized under Chapter
XIV of the Charter, it has its own detailed statute. Every member of the
U.N. is ipso facto a member of the International Court of Justice. When a
dispute between nations occurs over a legal matter, the issue "should as a
general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Jus-
tice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court."'" The
superpowers have been unwilling to use the Court on issues which they
consider vital to their national interests. For instance, when in 1984 Nica-
ragua brought an action against the United States, alleging violations of
international law, President Reagan refused to accept the Court's juris-
diction, withdrew the U.S. as a party to the case, and subsequently termi-
nated its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.17 This
response to both the International Court and international law was a
14. Supra note 6, at art. 47.
15. The U.N. military action in Korea, 1950-53, was under the U.N. flag, but not under
command of the Secretary-General, who had delegated command to General MacArthur.
Security Council action was possible only because the Soviet delegate had walked out ear-
lier. On the unworkability of the Military Staff committee, see FERENCZ, supra note 12, at
36.
16. Supra note 6, at art. 36, 3.
17. See U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL., Jan. 1986, at 67.
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blow to principles of justice among nations and to the Court's power.
One other failing remains to be mentioned, which is the inability to
expedite significant arms control. Article 26 states:
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of
the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall
be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military
Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the
Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for
the regulation of armaments.5
Those charged with national and international responsibility have failed
to implement weapons control.19 If one nation does not trust another,
that is all the more reason (1) to wish to see that nation's arsenal limited,
and (2) not to threaten that nation by spectacular accumulation of power-
ful weapons and increasingly hostile rhetoric.2" A nation only needs
enough armaments to show it is serious, not easily cowed, and not to be
taken lightly. The conventional Cold War rationale has many flaws, but
the transition from MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to "Who's-
Ahead-In-The-Arms-Race?" seems extremely illogical.2 1 Of all the unten-
able assumptions that leaders of nations make, none is more suspect than
''our enemy will perceive sanity as weakness."
U.N. initiatives are often stymied by states with veto power or by a
majority coalition in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the Secretary-
General at times needs to speak out bluntly, taking responsible leaders to
task. Although hampered by national policies which limit constructive ac-
tion, the position, insofar as it involves heavy responsibilities, carries
strong leadership requirements. Part of the U.N.'s meaning and symbol-
ism implies that it should be a few notches above the common level of
nationalism. Moreover, there are some occasions in which the Secretary-
General has the role of moral spokesperson for the people of the world
(Javier Perez de Cu6llar has been a marked improvement in this regard).
Similarly, although they are selected as national representatives, U.N.
Ambassadors should promote U.N. purposes.
A reflection on the history of our own government reveals that re-
sponsible criticism of social intitutions can correct and improve them.
18. Supra note 6, at art. 26 (emphasis added).
19. See 20 DEF. MONITOR, No. 4 (1991); see also Middle East Missile Sales: The Sup-
pliers and the Supplied, 13 NUCLEUS 5 (1991); STANLEY FOUNDATION, BEYOND COLD WAR 21-
37 (1990); Swords Into Plowshares, UNESCO COURIER, Mar. 1982, at 5-33; ARM CONTROL,
DISARMAMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 89-121, 365-75 (Donald G. Brennan ed., 1961).
20. Oct. 15: "We're dealing with Hitler revisited;" Oct. 23: a comparison with Hitler's
"Death's Head Battalions;" Nov. 1: "brutality that I don't believe Adolf Hitler ever partici-
pated in;" quoted in More than a Madman, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 7, 1991, at 20.
21. See generally STEVEN KULL, MINDS AT WAR: NUCLEAR REALITY AND THE INNER CON-
FLICTS OF DEFENSE POLICYMAKERS (1988)(interviews with top level people in the Defense De-
partment and related industries).
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The Bill of Rights became effective in 1791. Seven years later the Alien
and Sedition Act contradicted the First Amendment by outlawing at-
tempts toward "unlawful assembly, or combination" and publishing "any
false, scandalous and malicious writing" bringing into disrepute the U.S.
government, Congress, or the President. As Professor Morris says, "The
Sedition Act was aimed at repressing political opposition," and it was
"carried out in a partisan manner. '22 It took three years for the Act to be
repealed, convictions pardoned, and fines restored with interest. That was
the same length of time it had taken to ratify and activate the Bill of
Rights. Criticism and debate of social institutions is one way to maintain
the health of such institutions. The more democratic an institution, the
more likely that there will be certain built-in inefficiencies and a risk of
faulty decisions. The mature reaction to these problems is to work and
vote for amendment where possible.
A similar maturity ought to apply to the United Nations, which re-
lates to far more complex institutional relationships than we have in our
country: numerous languages, ancient hostilities, deeply imbedded cul-
tures concentrated in definite areas, vastly greater populations, and the
obstacles posed by ingrained and competing national sovereignties.
Though our national government has more than two hundred years of
governmental experience, social momentum, and individual loyalty un-
dergirding it, most would agree that our government needs improvement.
Obviously, this also applies to the fledgling United Nations, which lacks
the police enforcement powers of a city, state or nation.
III. THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the U.N. Peace-Keeping
Forces, paying tribute to the "young people of many nations.., who, in
keeping with their ideals, voluntarily take on a demanding and hazardous
service in the cause of peace."2 2 More than 500,000 men and women from
fifty-eight countries have served in U.N. peace-keeping forces. There are
currently more than 10,000 from thirty-five countries serving as peace-
keepers under the U.N. flag. More than 700 have died while serving. In
many respects these Blue Berets, Soldiers of Peace, have forged peace
when the General Assembly was unable to act because of U.S./U.S.S.R.
hostility. As the Secretary-General stated in a lecture at Cambridge
University:
[T]he onset and persistence of the Cold War could have paralyzed the
[United Nations] . . . But it is a measure of the inner vitality and
resilience of the Organization that, instead of allowing this factor to
block all its endeavors, it found other ways of defusing conflicts. It
originated the concept of peace-keeping to contain hostilities at the
22. RICHARD B. MORRIS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 129 (1953).
23. United Nations Association USA, United Nations Focus, Peace-Keeping, at 40-47
(1989). [Hereinafter "UNA Peace-Keeping"].
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regional level. The technique of conflict control ... in diverse theaters
has been one of the most constructive innovations in the field of inter-
national affairs in our age.24
The U.N. Charter does not provide for Peace-Keeping Forces; it does
however, support such operations. The Preamble lists as one of its main
purposes, the establishment of "conditions under which justice and re-
spect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained." Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes," addresses negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, use of regional institutions or arrange-
ments, "or other peaceful means of their own choice."
"Peace-Keeping" refers to situations where conflict has momentarily
subsided and where there is grave danger that the peace will collapse.
The presence of the Blue Berets prevents the parties from becoming em-
broiled in conflict and keeps the parties working peacefully together,
seeking negotiated settlements. There are two types of Peace-Keeping op-
erations: Observer Missions, teams of unarned military officers; and
Peace-Keeping Forces, including all ranks of troops which carry light
weapons, normally used only in self-defense. The Secretary-General
stated:
In a larger perspective, we must work towards a time when war will
cease to be an acceptable option of national policy or a possible means
of settling disputes and when a reliable and respected international
system will take its place. In this perspective, the development of in-
ternational peace-keeping has an essential place, just as the concept of
civil police was essential to the development of the rule of law within
nation states.2"
The achievements of the Soldiers of Peace should be better known.
As observers, they were on the Iran-Iraq cease-fire line, in Afghanistan,
India-Pakistan, southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and Cyprus. As for
what they do, Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary-General for
Special Political Affairs at the U.N., has said, "It is like the staff in a
hospital engaged in getting the patient's temperature down and keeping
him reasonably healthy. And when you get to a certain point, a great sur-
geon may be able to arrive and deal with the problem. 2 6 Typical of the
assignments of peace-keeping operations are:
1. Observing a situation and reporting to the Secretary-General;
2. Investigating incidents and negotiating to avoid resumption of
fighting;
3. Physically controlling of buffer zones;
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 47.
26. Id. at 43.
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4. Controlling movements of armed personnel and weaponry in sensi-
tive areas;
5. Verifying compliance or violations in regard to cease-fire or other
agreements;
6. Assisting in maintaining law and order;
7. Assisting local governments to restore normal order after fighting
has taken place; and
8. Providing humanitarian assistance to the local population.
Implicit in these functions is recognition that after severe fighting
many normal operations of an area will have broken down, such as police
coverage, emergency medical services, and communications. Several such
U.N. operations, both in Iraq and at its borders, provided such relief and
health care. Sadruddin Aga Khan, who carried out similar assignments in
Afghanistan, released reports based on field studies of the need in many
places for food, blankets, and medicine.17 These reports undoubtedly
played an important role in persuading the Security Council to authorize
limited Iraqi oil exports, under the Secretary-General's supervision, to fi-
nance such relief.
28
Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on April 9, 1991, mandated
the official cease-fire and also called for the establishment of the United
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM).29 On that same date
Javier P6rez de Cu6llar announced that 300 military observers and 680
soldiers had been deployed in the demilitarized zone between Iraq and
Kuwait to monitor military personnel withdrawals, equipment withdraw-
als and traffic. Additionally, the U.N. is also charged by Resolution 687
with overseeing the elimination of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons."
IV. PEACE-MAKING FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Peace-Making refers to situations where armed conflict exists and
where the U.N. has been called in to mediate. Thus it differs from Peace-
Keeping, which applies to situations in which there exists a fragile peace,
truce, or cease-fire in effect." In actual practice the two functions may
27. See Patrick E. Tyler, Mounting Health Crisis Seen in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
1991, at Al; see also Interview with Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
in KAYHAN INT'L, reprinted in WORLD PREss REV., July 1991, at 11.
28. Security Council vote August 15, 1991. It is ironic that with all the additional de-
mands made upon the United Nations, and despite the vote by the U.S. Congress in 1990 to
begin annually paying 20 percent of the amount owed to the U.N. until it is paid off, as of
June 1991 no arrearage payments have been made. Thomas K. Hafen, U.N. Force Deployed
in Gulf, THE INTERDEPENDANT, June-July 1991, at 4-5.
29. U.N. SC Res. 687, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
30. U.N. SC Res. 687, supra note 29.
31. United Nations Association USA, United Nations Focus, Peace-Making, at 48-55
(1989).
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overlap and intermingle, as was apparent in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and
Syria-Israel. Peace-Making operations require a stronger need for protec-
tion since the risk is high of a sporadic attack on U.N. personnel. Peace-
Making armaments are inadequate for sustained defense; they are in-
tended only to provide temporary deterrence sufficient to impede an at-
tack until greater force arrives. "U.N. peace-keeping works through per-
suasion, moral force and diplomatic pressure, as opposed to military force
and coercion. '.2 "Alternatives to the use of force" does not completely
divorce the possible use of defensive force. Commitment to peaceful
methods simply reverses the conventional "fight first and talk later"
stance. However, two attributes provide an advantage to the U.N. forces:
impartiality and permanence. Javier P6rez de Cu6llar said in his Nobel
Peace Prize acceptance address:
The Secretary-General and his representatives may not be more tal-
ented than national diplomats, but they have the advantage that they
are independent of States. They are, consequently, more able to win
the confidence of parties to a conflict in the exercise of good offices.
Their permanence, however, is a distinct advantage in the case of pro-
tracted negotiations. Indeed, one reason we were able to seize as rap-
idly as we did the opportunity for peace, offered us by the changing
international climate, was because we had, for years, been maintaining
close contact with the parties involved and working tirelessly to bring
their views closer together.
3 3
Nambia's achievement of independence exemplifies this impartiality
and permanence. Resolution 435 of the Security Council in 1978 called for
free and fair elections to choose a Nambian constituent assembly. 4 For
ten years the Security Council and the Secretary-General diligently
worked, mainly behind the scenes, to secure these elections. In January
1989 the Security Council was able to put Resolution 435 into effect, end-
ing more than twenty years of warfare.3 " Six months later more than
6,000 people - military and civilian - from 109 nations were cooperat-
ing in the U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The military
component monitored the cease-fire and withdrawal, demobilization, and
assistance to the civilian component. This component had the responsi-
bility for preventing intimidation or interference with the election pro-
cess, and, if necessary, to ensure the good conduct of the territory's ex-
isting police forces, and to do so with scrupulous impartiality.
In 1987 the Secretary-General announced that all issues had been re-
solved in the U.N. plan, save one: South Africa's insistence that
Namibia's independence must be linked to Cuban withdrawal of forces
from Angola. In late 1988 a U.S. mediated accord was signed at the U.N.
32. Id. at 55.
33. Id.
34. U.N. SC Res. 435, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1563 (1989).
35. See generally Reports, Documents on Peace in Southwestern Africa and Transi-
tion for Namibian Independence, 28 I.L.M. 944 (1989).
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by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, implementing the U.N. plan for
Namibia's independence with a U.N. military observer mission and the
U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), to verify the redeploy-
ment and gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.3 6 The words
of Theodore C. Sorensen appropriately highlight the magnitude of such a
victory:
The single greatest enemy of law is war ... War requires power; law
limits power. War feeds on emotion; law is based on reason. War justi-
fies emergency measures; law requires a long-range perspective. War
weakens law, distorts it, abuses it, overrides it, suspends it. War, I
repeat, is the single greatest enemy of law.37
The encouragement garnered from such words is necessary, for, as the
Secretary-General has said:
Our powers of destruction have increased to the point where it is
madness to use them. The necessity of the rule of law in our crowded,
interdependent planet is becoming increasingly evident. It is clear
that if we fail to act together on many matters we may lose the capac-
ity to act at all.38
V. THE COSTS OF THE GULF WAR
Examination of the Gulf War in terms of its costs and benefits pro-
vides a necessary background for consideration of the costs and benefits
of alternatives to force. The purpose of the following list is to give a broad
picture of the many forms of "cost" of the Gulf War. Data are not availa-
ble for a precise and complete accounting; some of the forms of value
destroyed are not quantifiable, yet their reality is palpable, and some of
the collateral effects are knowable only to a small extent.
A. Financial
The monetary cost might seem to be the easiest to calculate, but
there are many aspects which are inaccessible. The Pentagon announced
the total cost of $61 billion, which was higher than previously stated and
well beyond contributions from other nations. 9 This figure does not in-
clude the $9 billion debt forgiveness granted to Egypt (and similar gratui-
36. Id.
37. Theodore C. Sorensen, Law: The Most Powerful Alternative to War, 4 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 13, 15 (1980).
38. United Nations Focus, Peace-Making, supra note 31, at 55 (quoting the Secretary-
General's Nobel Peace Price acceptance address). The comment in the Stanley Foundation
report states, "[It] is not internationalism that is in crisis, but rather multilaterialism that is
in disarray." The United Nations and the Future of Internationalism, at 14 (1987). A prob-
lematic challenge not dealt with here is that most wars since World War II have been within
nations, not between two nations. The Gulf War was an exception, but while that was going
on there were twenty-eight other conflicts being fought within nation-states, not including
Yugoslavia.
39. Gulf War Price Tab Pegged at $61 Billion, L.A. Tisss, Nov. 8, 1991, at 15, col. 1.
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ties to other nations), the loss or abandonment of equipment, businesses
with losses either from disruption in the area or consequences in commu-
nities (airlines, restaurants, health services and other enterprises re-
stricted because were employees summoned to war), and in addition, the
general effect on the economy. The financial cost of the war cannot be
limited to the United States alone. For example, thousands of Filipino
workers were dismissed. Many women who were domestic workers were
not paid wages and, because of their gender, had no standing in either
Iraqi or Kuwaiti courts. The number of such workers from several third
world countries was very large and the money they sent home was impor-
tant to both their families and to their home countries' depressed econo-
mies. 40 Consequently, $61 billion only begins to address the full financial
cost.
B. Casualties
The U.S. and Allied Forces casualties were remarkably low, consider-
ing the intensity of their use of force. Thirty five of the 148 American
combat deaths,4 ' or 23%, were from friendly fire.2 A senior military offi-
cial stated that more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and more than 100,000
civilians died during the forty-three days of combat.' 3 Others place the
figures much higher.
Staggering casualties also occurred after the war. Estimates are ex-
ceedingly rough; perhaps 20,000 were killed in the Iraqi civil war and
somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000 Kuwaitis were killed during the occu-
pation by Iraq." The U.S. government has not released any official infor-
mation about Iraqi deaths, even though the Geneva Convention lists this
as a requirement after the conclusion of a war. We know even less about
the permanent injuries: blindness, insanity, loss of limbs, or to what ex-
tent children were the victims. Whatever the eventual totals, the deaths
and injuries were far from insignificant when thought of in human rather
than statistical terms, and in global rather than merely American terms.
C. Refugees
Again estimates vary, but roughly three million refugees fled into
Iran, one million into Jordan, and two million into or at the border of
Turkey. This does not include the displaced workers from the Philip-
pines, India, and Pakistan or the Palestinians and Iraqis fleeing from per-
secution in post-war Kuwait. Kuwait has been deporting 300 foreigners a
week as late as August, according to the Red Cross. Prior to the Gulf War
40. Innocent Lives in the Balance, ASIAWEEK, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REv., Nov.
1990, at 20.
41. Bill Gannon, Gulf War Tactics Being Scrutinized; High-Tech Weaponry Had
Flaws, THE GAzrrE, Sep. 21, 1991, at B6.
42. Id.
43. Steven Thomma, Knight-Ridder News Service, May 30, 1991.
44. Id.
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there were more than fifteen million refugees in the world, more than half
being in the Middle East and South Africa.4" This emphasizes the re-
gional impact of adding three to five million more refugees to what was
already a critical situation.
D. Environment and Resources
Reports on environmental damage have varied, depending on what
factors were measured, the extent of the survey, and who paid for the
study. It will probably be some time before effects on the flora and fauna
can be accurately determined. However, if environment refers to potable
water, acceptable air quality, unpolluted shores and cities with adequate
sewage, we do know that Iraq and Kuwait have suffered severe damage."'
Of course damage from oil slicks and smoke from the fires has been
widely publicized. These were the direct result of armed conflict. During
the months the sanctions were in effect there were no oil wells set on fire.
It was in January that Iraqi troops opened the pipes from the al-Ahamdi
terminal and dumped oil into the gulf. As was stated in one report:
At the same time, the Allied air campaign bombed tankers and refin-
eries, adding thousands of more barrels to the slick, which at one time
flowed south toward Saudi Arabia. Experts agree, however, that about
3.25 million barrels that were dumped into the gulf by Iraqi troops
and Allied air raids proved far easier to clean up than the Doomsday
estimates [released by Pentagon officials] of 12 million to 13 million
barrels. 7
A typical estimate is that eighty-five percent of Kuwait's wells were
set on fire by Iraqis on February 22, burning six billion barrels a day, a
terrible, unjustifiable and senseless act. Add to that the amount of fuel
consumed in the gigantic transport of troops and equipment and the
more than 100,000 sorties flown over Iraq.4s This was far and away the
largest consumption and loss of this non-renewable resource in a compa-
rable period in the history of the world. One major purpose of the war
was to protect Gulf oil reserves for the future. It must be conceded that
armed force failed to accomplish this effectively.
45. World Refugee Survey, 1989 World Refugee Statistics, at 30, 31 (U.S. Comm. for
Refugees, Washington, D.C., 1989). This does not include refugees who have resettled.
46. E.g. Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Officials Believe Iraq Will Take Years to Rebuild, N.Y.
TimSs, June 3, 1991, at Al; Prof. Jassem Al-Hassan on the oil fires, Associated Press, August
13, 1991; Melinda Liu, Apocalypse Near, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 1, 1991, at 14-16.
47. Carol Rosenberg, report on the Gulf oil spill, Knight-Ridder News Service, Apr. 18,
1991.
48. Susanne M. Schafer, Air Force: War Against Iraq Decided Within Hours, Associ-
ated Press release, Mar. 18, 1991. As of February 4, there had been 44,000 sorties over Iraq,
one for every minute since the war began. It was later determined that 640 wells had been
set on fire.
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E. Other Costs
One could continue to summarize additional types of costs of the
Gulf War. Such a list would include: diversion from domestic issues; di-
version from global problems of hunger, oppression, conflict, and dis-
placed persons; intensification of ethnic prejudices (toward Kurds, Pales-
tinians, Shiites, and in the U.S. toward Arabs); destruction of the infra-
structure in Iraq; destabilization of governments; archeological damage;
and the deterioration of attitudes. The latter refers to attitudes of mind
and spirit; the cynacism which occurs (e.g., silent leges inter arma [laws
are silent in time of war] 9 and Aeschylus' time-honored statement, "In
war, truth is the first casualty").5
VI. POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE GULF WAR
It cannot be denied that there were positive results from the Gulf
war, the chief one being that the Iraqi army was driven out of Kuwait.
This, however, occurred at a terrible price - the destruction of Kuwait.
Part of this took place during Iraq's invasion and initial occupation, part
was intensified in response to the bombing which began January 16.
Many art treasures taken from Kuwait were returned, as was some of the
stolen gold." Some of these treasures, however, were deliberately de-
stroyed. However, if the war was primarily to oust Saddam, it did not
achieve its objective. The CIA's part in urging Kurdish revolt52 was based
on somewhat defective intelligence, if it was thought that such a revolt
would lead to Saddam's downfall. But the war did demonstrate the effec-
49. Cicero, For Milo iv.
50. There are several examples of this maxim. The soldier who claimed to have been
brutally tortured by his Iraq captors was featured repeatedly, but when it was revealed that
his facial bruises were the result of a plane accident and self-inflicted blows, coverage was
slight. See Michael Wines, After the War: P.O. W.'s; Ex-PO. W.'s Offer Accounts of Terror
and Torture in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. .15, 1991, at 1, col. 5. U.S. intelligence officers said
they found shipping documents in Arabic that showed the equipment was delivered after
the embargo took effect in August. Ten days after the war was over the State Department
released a brief which stated that no such documents were found. See Paul Bedard, U.S.
Probes Iraq's Rearming; Jordan Denies It Is Conduit, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, at Al.
Moreover, the President emphasized that the actions of the U.S. would be defensive and
that the sanctions would be given time. However, within four days he called for an "in-
terdiction" (blockade). False information was given out in connection with the tragic bomb-
ing of the air raid shelter February 13. See, e.g., John Barry, What Really Happened,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1991, at 20. One might well say that such things are inevitable in war;
this is precisely the point. Deception is inextricably attached to war and it leads to a pro-
gressively easier public toleration of deception. Cf. Media Ethics Update, Spring 1991; Ved
P. Nanda, The Iran-Contra Affair - A Symptom of a Malady?, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 368-
370 (1989).
51. Walter Putnam, Kuwaitis to Visit Baghdad to Reclaim Art Treasures, Associated
Press, Aug. 12, 1991. Among the stolen materials was art worth at least $500 million and
forty tons of gold.
52. Tim Weiner, CIA Broadcasts Urged Kurds On, Knight-Ridder News Service, April
6, 1991.
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tiveness of the Patriot anti-missile missiles and the coordination of the
Allied troops. It also dispelled some false beliefs, i.e. that Arab soldiers
would never surrender to non-Arab forces." Another important conse-
quence was the condition that Iraq destroy its chemical weapons, biologi-
cal weapons, and nuclear materials and laboratories.
VII. NON-VIOLENT METHODS
Nonviolent methods of addressing conflict also have costs and limita-
tions. One major limitation is that such methods are slow to accomplish
their goals, and thus are politically difficult to sell. People like to see re-
sults. Political opponents often charge weakness and cowardice, insisting
that such methods do not work. Nonviolent methods do not have dra-
matic appeal suitable for headlines and televised excitement. This disad-
vantage is not minor, for effective social procedures must have public
support. Hate can be aroused by shouting a few words and waving a
bloody shirt. Understanding requires pedestrian explanation, patience,
and long-term dedication. That sanctions can achieve remarkable trans-
formations under the most difficult circumstances is illustrated by South
Africa; however, that has taken many years."
A second limitation is that results are not guaranteed. That is true of
all methods for promoting public policy, but somehow people expect one
hundred percent results from pacific procedures. They do not however,
make the same connection between force and its failures. Before the Gulf
crisis, 435,000 U.S. troops were stationed at 395 major military bases in
thirty-five foreign countries, with another 47,000 naval and marine corps
personnel aboard ships in foreign waters. During the 1980s the U.S. spent
$160 billion or more every year to defend Western Europe, $30 to $40
billion to defend parts of Asia, and $20 to $40 billion to protect U.S. ac-
cess to Persian Gulf oil.5 5 It can hardly be argued that these investments
have prevented problems and failures. However, few ask, "How did $300
billion spent in ten years to protect Persian Gulf oil prevent the invasion
of Kuwait or its loss of oil," or, "How did $350 billion bring stability to
the Philippines or human rights to Pakistan?"
At the same time, educated people can be entirely ignorant of the
accomplishments of the United Nations while complaining about its inef-
fectiveness. Obviously the task of educating the public on these matters
has been neglected. But as Pierre Elliott Trudeau has said, "Government
leaders everywhere are very much involved in the politics of war; they are
53. Russel Watson, After the Storm, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 1991, at 28.
54. See Ved P. Nanda, The Case for Comprehensive Multilateral Sanctions Against
South Africa-A Legal Framework, in EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS ON SoUTH AFRICA (G. Shepherd
ed.) (1989); Lindiwe Mkhondo, South African Apartheid - One Conflict That's Being Re-
solved, WORLD WISE, July 1991; Ved P. Nanda, When Do Sanctions Work?, DENVER POST,
July 28, 1991.
55." See generally 21 DEF. MONITOR, No. 1 (1991).
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not very much involved in the politics of peace." ' Yet, the facts are not
difficult to comprehend. Secretary-General Perez de Cu~llar pointed out
that the 1989 price of U.N. peace-keeping was $1.5 billion, almost exactly
one percent of the world's official arms exports for 1987, $164 billion.5 7
A third limitation is that sanctions make life more difficult for the
populace, especially the poor. The rulers and the privileged manage very
well. Oddly enough, the ordinary people understand this and take the
hardships very well. Their anger turns toward their rulers who have
brought these hardships to pass. This contrasts with those who have in-
stead suffered a forceful attack. Their anger and fear turn upon those
who attack them, not their rulers. It was the Blacks in South Africa who
wanted the sanctions to continue.58 In World War I, production of war
material actually increased in Hamburg as a result of the devastating
bombing." It is strange to hear those who express great sympathy for the
populace enduring the hardships of sanctions dismiss the tragedies and
terrors visited upon them by round-the-clock bombing.
Sanctions also penalize businesses stationed in the quarantined area.
This provides a major reason for the political opposition to sanctions in
South Africa as well as Iraq. The utilization of weaponry and its support
brings profit to selected industries and prestige to the military; nonvio-
lent methods do not. Of course the government acquires debt in the for-
mer and the national economy is far better off when nonviolent proce-
dures are followed, but that is politically difficult to sell compared with
immediate and visible profit, which is why Heilbroner calls this arrange-
ment "military socialism."60
A fourth limitation of economic and diplomatic measures is that they
require restraint despite intensified public passions. Kuwait was ravaged,
held hostage, and was vulnerable. Such a situation calls for delicacy, skill,
and shrewdness, not bombast and rash threats. But the most vocal part of
the public clamors for violent and rash actions. Some hostages may be
killed regardless of the type of response undertaken. However, hostages
may not appreciate a frontal attack to rescue them if the collateral effect
is to increase the possibility of torture and death. If the Gulf War was for
Emir Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir as-Sabah and members of the
Sabah family, such costs were inconsequential. If it was for the Kuwaitis
who stuck it out - the people themselves, including the 61% of the resi-
dents who were not Kuwaitis - then there is yet some accounting to be
56. Trudeau, The Nuclear Imperative, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., Jan. 1985, at
27.
57. UNA Peace-Keeping, supra note 23, at 47.
58. President Bush lifted U.S. sanctions against South Africa July 10 1991, but the
African National Congress and others opposed this. See Christopher S. Wren, DeKierk's
Victory: Without Resolving the Issue of Power, Pretoria Regains World Acceptance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1991, at A10.
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60. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 39 (1974).
1991
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
done.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I have stressed the political difficulties in mustering support for non-
violent social and international policies, because I believe that they are
the greatest barrier for such mature and effective measures, exacerbated
by the temptation for politicians to appeal to the violent and dramatic.
When the fighting ends, you still have to turn to negotiation to deal with
the settlement.
It is instructive to examine the news reports over the past few years
to see how frequently our government has publicly cautioned other states
to avoid bloodshed and violence, appealing for calmness and reason, at
the same time that we were using force and threat of force in our per-
ceived national interest. Our leaders understand perfectly well that to ne-
gotiate with your enemy is not a sign of weakness or cowardice, but of
wisdom and maturity - when it comes to other nations. We recom-
mended this policy to the Soviets with regard to the Balkan states, to
China in dealing with the dissidents in Cambodia, and many other places.
The U.S. has proclaimed the effectiveness of sanctions against Nicaragua,
Cuba, the U.S.S.R., Libya, Zimbabwe, Panama, while claiming that sanc-
tions do not work when it comes to China, South Africa, El Salvador, and
Iraq.
In the late fall of 1990, almost every day some high government offi-
cial announced that sanctions were ineffective and would never work in
Iraq. However, in December, CIA Director, William Webster testified
before the House Armed Services Committee that sanctions were having
a powerful effect in Iraq. Iraq was running out of cash, faced shortages of
basic foodstuffs, its tanks would gradually become inoperable, and its air
force would be able to maintain current operations for only three to six
months.6 Presumably, due to his intelligence resources, he was in a bet-
ter position than anyone else to report on this. Ironically, on the same
day as Webster's testimony, the Secretary of State was urging the Senate
to threaten war because the sanctions were a failure. Webster was not
heard from in public until January when he revised his story, saying that
although sanctions would adversely affect the Iraqi Air Force, "The Iraqi
Air Force is not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait."62
Verbal violence between states and leaders, such as President Bush
and Saddam Hussein, often muddles rational reasoning. A tragic example
occurred at the CIA's urging the Kurds to overthrow Saddam, as a result
of a secret order by Bush for the CIA to transmit Kurdish language radio
broadcasts into Iraq, and for tactical intelligence to be given to Kurdish
61. Lars-Erik Nelson, CIA Chief Did a Flip on Gulf War, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, January
15, 1991.
62. Id. Webster resigned May 8, 1991.
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rebels in Turkey. 3 The civil war which followed the armistice was a
bloodbath. Deaths from attacks by Iraqi Hind helicopters were matched
by refugees dying from disease and starvation. The U.N. team reported
2,000 dying each day in May; a State Department official said it was
3,000; a Harvard team said as many as 170,000 Iraqis could die by the end
of summer.6 4
Another example of being deluded by rhetoric is seen in the cliches
which become common when public passions are inflamed; for example,
"we have to teach him a lesson, or there will be other tyrants." As for this
cliche, which I call the "Didactic Theory of War," if war "teaches" so
well, how is it that the bombing of Tripoli did not deter the coup attempt
in Grenada in 1983, and why did not the Grenada action prevent
Noriega's theft of the Panamanian election in 1989, and why did not the
Panama invasion prevent Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait in
1990?
A final example of the double-standard is the propensity to judge
failures in the use of force and/or technology by one set of criteria and to
judge failures in programs of constructive human relations or social prob-
lem-solving by entirely different criteria. However, when there is a failure
or a disappointment in a program which is nonviolent and socially con-
structive in its purpose, all too often the response is, "Well, that goes to
show that things like that do not work." Thus any failure or delay in
effect of sanctions against Iraq was met with rejection of all economic and
diplomatic means for coping with the problem.
There are times in life when destructive force must be used. But this
should be a last resort in international relations, and if we are ever to
have a livable world it is imperative that we learn better ways to use al-
ternatives to force.
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